The principles agent problems and optimal mudarabah contract

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://umt-ir.umt.edu.my:8080/handle/123456789/5141

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DC Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Noraina Mazuin Sapuan	-
dc.date.accessioned	2017-04-02T01:47:40Z	-
dc.date.available	2017-04-02T01:47:40Z	-
dc.date.issued	2016-02	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/5141	-
dc.description.abstract	The principal-agent (agency) problems in mudarabah contract are severe without effective delegation of information between the contracting parties. Disclosure of information by an agent can help to reduce asymmetric information and generate sound decision by both contracting parties in the financing and securities investment based on the mudarabah contract.	en_US
dc.language.iso	en	en_US
dc.publisher	Terengganu: Universiti Malaysia Terengganu	en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries	KBP 1049 .N6 2016;	-
dc.subject	KBP 1049 .N6 2016	en_US
dc.subject	Noraina Mazuin Sapuan	en_US
dc.subject	Tesis PPPSE 2016	en_US
dc.subject	Financial institutions	en_US
dc.subject	Partnership (Islamic law)	en_US
dc.subject	Profit-sharing	en_US
dc.title	The principles agent problems and optimal mudarabah contract	en_US
dc.type	Thesis	en_US
Appears in Collections:	Pusat Pengajian Pembangunan Sosial dan Ekonomi..

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